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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4251 
_____________ 
 
PHYLLIS ATKINSON, 
 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NORTH JERSEY DEVELOPMENTAL; CAROLE WOLKE 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 06-05485) 
 District Judge:  Hon. Peter G. Sheridan 
 
Submitted September 20, 2011 
 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed December 1, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Phyllis Atkinson appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the 
North Jersey Developmental Center and its employee Carole Wolke (hereinafter 
“NJDC”) on her claims of racial discrimination and retaliation.  Atkinson contends that 
Wolke discriminated against her in giving her a low performance review, issuing her a 
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warning for arriving late to work, denying her vacation requests, having her job duties 
adjusted, and engaging her in a heated argument where Wolke said she would “fix” her.  
Additionally, Atkinson maintains that based on her complaints regarding these 
discriminatory acts, NJDC retaliated against her.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
I.   
 
 We write for the parties’ benefit and recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition.  Phyllis Atkinson is an African-American woman who was employed by 
NJDC as a clerk transcriber from 1980 until her retirement in September 2007.  In the fall 
of 2003, Carole Wolke, a Caucasian woman, was NJDC’s Assistant Director of Nursing 
and became Atkinson’s immediate supervisor.  In April 2004, Wolke performed 
Atkinson’s performance assessment review (“PAR”), assigning her a score of twenty-
four out of a possible thirty and citing specific areas where Atkinson could improve her 
job performance.  Wolke noted that this score indicated that Atkinson met the essential 
criteria for the majority of her job responsibilities and exceeded the essential criteria in 
the remaining duties.  Despite the fact that Wolke’s assessment was an improvement over 
Atkinson’s two previous PAR scores, she was not content with her review and requested 
a meeting with Wolke to discuss her score.  Wolke and Atkinson never met to review the 
PAR.  On September 24, 2004, Wolke sent a letter to the Director of Nursing Roxanne 
Lotts complaining about her PAR score, Wolke’s favoritism towards other employees, 
and that she was overworked with paperwork and felt underappreciated for the amount of 
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work she performed.  Wolke never received a copy of this letter.  Eventually, Atkinson’s 
PAR score was raised to a twenty-seven. 
 On December 1, 2004, Atkinson and Wolke exchanged heated words, when 
Wolke confronted her regarding statements she made to other co-workers that Wolke was 
a racist.  Atkinson contends that, during this conversation, Wolke stated that she would 
“fix” Atkinson if the comments continued.  Following the argument, Atkinson wrote 
another letter to Lotts recounting the confrontation and clarifying that she felt that Wolke 
discriminated against her “like a racist” because of past incidents.   
 Atkinson, on March 22, 2004, requested a vacation leave for the Thanksgiving 
holiday.  NJDC’s vacation policy required that Atkinson submit all such requests no later 
than March 15, 2004.  When she received no response, Atkinson re-submitted the request 
on November 19, 2004.  On that same day, Wolke denied her request for vacation.  
Despite this denial, a NJDC supervisor later granted Atkinson the vacation leave.   
 On February 14, 2005, Atkinson called NJDC around eleven in the morning, 
informing the staff that she would be late to work and stating that she would not arrive 
for another hour.  Atkinson called back to work around one in the afternoon requesting an 
emergency administrative leave day.  A supervisor granted her request, but she was able 
to report to work shortly afterwards.  Because Atkinson was supposed to report to work at 
nine in the morning and did not call in to give notice that she would be late until around 
eleven, Wolke issued her a “Red A” disciplinary notice.  This notice, however, was later 
removed from Atkinson’s record.  
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 Atkinson also alleges that during this time period Caucasian co-workers were 
treated more favorably than her.  Specifically, Atkinson contends that NJDC employee 
Donna Corroda, a Caucasian female, received a new desk and computer from Wolke, 
whereas Wolke told Atkinson she did not need a desk or computer to perform her job 
duties.  At all times, however, Atkinson had a desk and computer and, eventually, her 
desk was replaced with new furniture.   
 On February 28, 2005, Atkinson filed a New Jersey Grievance Procedure Form, 
complaining about suffering emotional distress and headaches related to harassment in 
the workplace.  The complaint did not include allegations of racial discrimination.  
Atkinson alleges that in response to this filing her new supervisor, Michael Buongiorno, 
started micromanaging her work.  On March 28, 2005, Atkinson filed a Discrimination 
Complaint with the New Jersey Department of Personnel.  Following this filing, Atkinson 
took an extended sick leave until June 2005.  Atkinson, upon her return, complained that 
she did not receive all her job responsibilities back, but admitted that she did not have a 
problem with the reduction in work because her duties were overwhelming.  From 2005 
through 2007, Atkinson took a series of medical leaves and retired in June 2007.  
 Atkinson filed a pro se complaint in the District Court of New Jersey, alleging 
race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
1
  On October 
5, 2010, the District Court granted summary judgment to NJDC, finding that Atkinson 
did not present a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII because she had not 
                                              
1
 The District Court dismissed all of Atkinson’s claims under New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination.  Atkinson does not appeal this dismissal.   
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demonstrated a causal connection between any alleged protected activity and a materially 
adverse action by NJDC.  Similarly, the District Court granted summary judgment on 
Atkinson’s discrimination claim, concluding that she had failed to show an adverse 
employment action to satisfy a prima facie claim of discrimination.  Further, even if such 
a prima facie case could be made, the District Court found that NJDC had articulated a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions and Atkinson had failed to show that 
these reasons were pretext for discrimination.  Atkinson filed a timely appeal.   
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, and we have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment is plenary, and we apply the same legal standard as it should 
have.  Vitalo v. Cabot Corp., 399 F.3d 536, 542 (3d Cir. 2005).  A party is entitled to 
summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  In conducting our analysis, we must view the record in the light most favorable to 
Atkinson, and must draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.  See Vitalo, 399 F.3d at 
542.  To defeat summary judgment, however, Atkinson must “show[] that the materials 
cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 
III. 
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
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individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).  
Additionally, Title VII contains an anti-retaliation provision which provides that it is “an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his 
employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice.”  Id. § 2000e-3(a).   
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation, as here, a 
plaintiff may prove her claim according to the burden-shifting framework set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Under McDonnell Douglas, 
the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful 
discrimination or retaliation.  Id. at 802.  If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden of 
production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
its decision.  Id.  Once the employer meets its “relatively light burden,” the burden of 
production returns to the plaintiff, who must show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual.  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 
(3d Cir. 1994).  Accordingly, once an employer has proffered a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff “generally must submit evidence which:  1) casts 
sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a 
factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication; or 2) allows the 
factfinder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or 
determinative cause of the adverse employment action.”  Id. at 762.  Because the ultimate 
issue is whether “discriminatory animus” motivated the employer, it is not enough to 
show that the employer made a “wrong or mistaken” decision.  Id. at 765 (citations 
7 
 
omitted).  Rather, the plaintiff must uncover “weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” in the employer’s explanation that 
would allow a reasonable factfinder to believe that the employer did not truly act for the 
asserted reason.  Id.  
For Atkinson to maintain a prima facie case of racial discrimination, she must 
show that (1) she is African American; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she 
experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated persons who are 
not African American were treated more favorably.  Jones v. Sch. Dist. Phila., 198 F.3d 
403, 410-11 (3d Cir. 1999).  We are not persuaded that Atkinson has demonstrated a 
prima facie case of discrimination, as she has failed to show she experienced an adverse 
employment action or that similarly situated persons not in her protected class were 
treated more favorably.  The only possible adverse employment action that Atkinson 
raises is the reduction in her workload, which the record demonstrates was requested by 
Atkinson herself through her complaints about feeling overwhelmed by her job duties.  
To the extent that Atkinson alleges that her PAR score, vacation leave, and “Red A” 
disciplinary notice resulted in adverse employment actions, we note that these complaints 
were adjusted in Atkinson’s favor.  Further, we agree with the District Court that the 
record does not demonstrate that NJDC or Wolke treated non-African Americans more 
favorably, as Atkinson’s allegations appear self-serving and contradictory to her 
deposition testimony.  Therefore, we agree with the District Court that Atkinson has not 
established a prima facie case of race discrimination.   
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To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Atkinson must show:  (1) she 
engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a 
causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.  Jalil 
v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989).  We conclude that Atkinson has failed 
to sustain a prima facie claim of retaliation because she failed to raise an instance where 
she engaged in a protected activity, and, similar to her discrimination claim, there is no 
evidence that Atkinson suffered an adverse employment action.  As a result, we agree 
with the District Court that Atkinson cannot maintain a prima facie case of retaliation.    
Moreover, even assuming that Atkinson could demonstrate a prima facie case of 
discrimination and retaliation, NJDC has proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons 
for all of its actions – for example, Atkinson’s job performance and tardiness in 
submission of her vacation request and arrival to work – and Atkinson has failed to show 
these reasons were a pretext for discrimination.   Therefore, we conclude that Atkinson’s 
discrimination and retaliation claims have no merit and will affirm the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment.  
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
 
